No Significant Development, No Budget Revision: The High Court Clarifies CPR 3.15A in Bassey v Whittaker
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The decision in Mr Ndifreke Bassey v Mr Shanardo Whittaker & Ors [2026] EWHC 2126 (KB) provides useful guidance on the court's approach to costs budget variation.
The matter was a serious road traffic accident involving a pedestrian who was struck down by a car driven by the First Defendant. Liability was admitted and judgment entered. The appeal was brought by the Second Defendant, the insurer.
For context, the Claimant’s costs budget was approved in the sum of £1,028,580.85, having been claimed at £1,981,163.55. The court recorded that the Claimant’s incurred costs were disproportionate. By comparison, the Second Defendant’s costs budget was agreed in the sum of £341,382.01. Costs budgeting proceeded on the basis that no provision had been made for experts attending trial to give evidence.
This was a High Court matter in Birmingham heard by Mr Justice Cavanagh. The High Court had to consider the meaning and effect of CPR 3.15A and the circumstances in which the court may revise a costs budget. Specifically, the court was asked to consider whether costs budgets can be revised where there are no significant developments.
Speed Read
For those wanting a swift overview:
1) The court does not have the power to vary costs budgets if there have been no significant developments.
2) If the parties agree that there has been a significant development, it is unlikely that a judge would go behind that agreement.
3) The judgment leaves open the possibility that the court may have the power to vary costs budgets where the parties agree to that course of action, even if there is no significant development. No ruling on this point was, however, given.
4) Not every development in litigation will justify revisions to the costs budget. Here the court held that “It would not be in the interests of justice or the overriding objective if there was scope for constant tinkering with costs budgets if there are developments in the litigation. The “significant developments” test is satisfied if the development or developments is or are something that was not and could not reasonably have been anticipated by the applicant for revision at the time of the previously approved budget.”
5) It was agreed between the parties that developments which fell short of being significant developments after costs budgets have been finalised can argue before the court there is a good reason to depart from the costs budget. It was, however, also agreed that “it was much better for a party to obtain revision to the costs budget under CPR 3.15A then to throw itself on the mercy of a costs judge at the end of the trial. A revision to the costs budget provides certainty, and a party would have an uphill battle if they sought to persuade a costs judge to depart from the costs budget after the trial was over”.
6) The key question is what was “an obvious possibility at the time of the costs budgeting exercise”. Here the Claimant should have known it was a possibility that, in a case concerning assessment of damages for personal injury, that further expert reports and quantum statements might be required. That it also ought to have been obvious at the time of the costs budgeting exercise that new therapies and rehabilitation may be required, particularly given the Claimant was aware of a potential change to accommodation and instruction of a new case manager at the time the costs budget was prepared.
7) It was not relevant whether the experts provided updated reports or not, what was relevant was that the Claimant ought to have known the experts would need to comment on the impact of new rehabilitation and therapy in any event. The District Judge was entitled to hold that the extra work by the experts should have known or reasonably anticipated when costs budgets were prepared.
8) An extension to the trial window and additional disclosure as a consequence can be readily anticipated.
9) Illustrative examples of significant developments may include attendance of experts to give oral evidence at trial or the use of surveillance evidence. These were not relevant to the claim at hand.
What is abundantly clear is that costs budget preparation needs to be properly considered in tandem with the file handler. Assumptions need to be drawn tightly so it is clear on exactly what basis a costs budget has been approved.
When it comes to significant developments these will need to be considered on a case by case basis but it is crucial that steps to vary are taken promptly. There is a clear line between a significant and general development in the case. Revision of the budget is preferable, although parties may still seek to rely on a "good reason" to depart from the approved budget at detailed assessment.
There will be questions around whether the High Court judgment could encourage more defensive costs budgets alongside more technical challenges where budget variation is sought. It exposes a tension between what is reasonably foreseeable (and thus would be approved in a costs budget) and not likely (which would not). What is an ‘obvious possibility’ is likely to be highly subjective. It could well be an unintended consequence of the decision.
The court did not adjudicate the position where the parties had agreed by consent that budgets could be revised where there were no significant developments, there is clear scope to argue the courts would have power to vary a budget in such circumstances.
The Case
The High Court gave consideration to the provisions of CPR 3.15 and 3.15A. CPR 3.15A provides that a party must revise its budgeted costs upwards or downwards where significant developments in the litigation warrant such revisions.
Following the setting of directions, the parties agreed to vary the same by consent. The variations were as follows:
1) Trial window was extended due to lack of common availability of the parties.
2) Time was extended for service of the parties’ updated and further expert evidence (medical and non-medical).
3) Time was extended for the joint-statements of the experts.
4) Rolling disclosure was altered from every 4 months, to every 3 months.
5) The Claimant was given permission for two additional quantum witness statements.
6) The dates for updated schedules and counter-schedules of loss were also extended.
In addition, it was submitted that there had been changes to the Case Manager from one who was jointly instructed, to sole instruction and this had led to a raft of additional rehabilitation and private referrals. This would include changes to the Claimant’s accommodation to open up further types of therapy and rehabilitation. This in turn, it was submitted by the Claimant, would necessitate additional updated expert evidence.
The court gave directions for the parties to file and serve Precedent Ts in light of the variations to the case management directions.
The court held at the subsequent costs management hearing that there was not a finding of a significant development but that the court could still increase the budgeted costs.
The Appeal
There were three points for the court to consider on appeal:
1) Does the court have the power to vary a budget where there are no significant developments?
The High Court followed the view of Master Kaye in Persimmon Homes Ltd v Osborne Clark LLP [2021] EWHC 831 (Ch) that:
“99. if there had not been a significant development, the court need go further, the jurisdiction in CPR 3.15A is simply not engaged”.
Or in more simplistic terms if there is no significant development, the court cannot exercise its powers in relation to costs budget variation.
Mr Justice Cavanagh held that “the court does not have a general discretion to vary costs budgets even if there have been no significant developments […] it is clear from the structure of CPR 3 that the power for the court to amend costs budgets must be found in CPR 3.15A, and so the preconditions of that rule must be met”.
2) Was the court wrong to find there were no significant developments?
The Claimant’s position was that the varied directions had given rise to significant developments, coupled with the change in Case Manager and extension of therapies and rehabilitations. This would necessitate additional evidence which would require more work than originally envisaged.
The Defendant’s position was that the extension of the trial window was not unusual, that the early disclosure of expert evidence was at the Claimant’s election and this was the reason supplementary reports were needed and that the additional disclosure exercise required was limited to only one further round of disclosure. Concerning additional witness evidence, the Defendant contended that the Claimant had budgeted for 8 witness statements and had only served 6, so the additional two witness statements were consistent with what was budgeted for.
The court had to consider whether the developments were known, or could reasonably have been anticipated, when the costs budget was finalised. Was it within contemplation of the parties that the Respondent would move accommodation and there would be new rehabilitation and therapy?
Mr Justice Cavanagh stated that:
“It would not be in the interests of justice or the overriding objective if there was scope for constant tinkering with costs budgets if there are developments in the litigation. The “significant developments” test is satisfied if the development or developments is or are something that was not and could not reasonably have been anticipated by the applicant for revision at the time of the previously approved budget.”
Whilst it was accepted parties could seek to argue good reason to depart from a costs budget in any subsequent costs proceedings, it was also agreed that variation provided greater certainty and the good reason test would be more difficult to argue.
The court considered the scope of appeal to the exercise of judicial discretion noting the comments in Churchill v Boot as to whether the initial judicial decision had “exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible”.
Mr Justice Cavanagh upheld the earlier decision that there were no significant developments. He stated that:
“86. It is almost always a possibility, in a case concerning assessment of damages for personal injury, that further expert reports and further quantum statements might be required. The possibility that there might be changes to the Respondent’s condition as a result of new therapy or rehabilitation was an obvious possibility at the time of the costs budgeting exercise, especially as it was already known that he might move accommodation and that this might broaden the scope for different forms of therapy and rehabilitation. It was known that the experts would have to consider whether any of this made a difference to their views. The pressing need for the Respondent to move accommodation was referred to at the costs budgeting hearing in December 2024, as was the likely need for a new case manager. Indeed, at the hearing in December 2024, Mr Plaut had asked the District Judge to postpone costs budgeting until the position became clearer, but the District Judge declined to do so.
87. The Respondent served all of his expert medical evidence in advance of the hearing in November 2025. This was served two months late, according to the timetable, and two days before that hearing. The Appellant says that the Respondent should have held off filing its expert medical evidence at that stage, as the Appellant did, because by then the parties knew that the expert evidence would have to be revisited. The Appellant says that this was a mis-judgment and means that the Respondent’s legal team are at fault if this increases the costs of preparing the expert evidence. In my view, this is a somewhat harsh criticism. Most of the work on preparing the expert evidence for the Respondent had already been completed by November 2025, and expert reports were ready to be filed. The Respondent would incur additional costs when his medical experts took account of the impact of new rehabilitation and therapy, whether or not they filed one expert report or two. But this is all beside the point. What matters is that the District Judge was entitled to find that the extra work by the medical experts was known or reasonably anticipated at the time that the budgets were finalised in December 2024, and so the further work by the medical experts did not amount to significant developments.
88. Similarly, it can readily be anticipated that the trial window might slip and that there may be additional disclosure. In fact, in this case, disclosure was given when new material was available, rather than on a strict 3-month or 4-month cycle.
89. Mr Plaut showed me some correspondence that indicated that, at one stage between November 2025 and February 2026, the Appellant’s solicitors had anticipated that there might be agreement about significant developments. However, no such agreement was reached and this does not mean that the Appellant had conceded that there were significant developments.
90. In argument before me, Mr Plaut put forward some examples of developments in litigation which are frequently considered by judges to be significant developments. These include the attendance of medical experts at court, and the use of surveillance evidence. Such other examples do not assist the court in the present case. Each case depends on its own facts.”
The High Court allowed the appeal, upholding the District Judge’s finding that there were no significant developments
3) Does the court have the power to revise costs budgets where the parties agreed this should happen by consent.
On this point the court considered what the order actually said. The view reached was that the order simply gave directions so that “questions of whether there have been significant developments and as to whether the costs budgets should be revised (which does not automatically follow even if there have been significant developments) could be determined at the next hearing on 6 February 2026.”
It was also considered that the evidence available concerning the hearing where costs management directions were set indicated that there was no such agreement between the parties as to revising costs budgets.
The court held that there was no ruling by consent that the costs budget would be revised, nor any ruling that there had been significant developments since the costs budget had been determined. As such the court did not need to give a decision on this point.
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