Mazur Court of Appeal Judgment
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The Court of Appeal has given its long-anticipated judgment in Mazur. The judgment itself can be read here. The appeal has been unanimously allowed and is a hugely consequential victory for Cilex.
It addresses a significant issue as to the extent to which reserved activity can be undertaken by non-authorised persons. In short, so long as there is proper supervision in place, acts of litigation may be delegated to a non-authorised person. It will be for the regulators, however, to address exactly what proper supervision/management is. Consequently, some ambiguity does remain.
The previous High Court decision saw Mr Justice Sheldon hold that non-authorised individuals cannot conduct litigation, even under supervision. This was significant as a breach of the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA 2007) is a criminal offence which could include a prison sentence and monetary fine.
The judgment was significant as it placed a lens on who does and does not have practising rights and in particular saw significant controversy around Cilex members and the extent of their rights to undertake reserved activity.
There will be more to follow as the judgment is fully considered and digested.
Speed Read
The Court of Appeal have found that:
a) A non-authorised person can undertake reserved activity so long as as an authorised person retains overall responsibility. That authorised person must have the responsibility for the proceedings and the act of ‘carrying on’.
b) In Mazur, specifically evidence of meeting and speaking with the non-authorised person regularly on individual cases, alongside monthly face to face meetings to discuss work provided evidence of supervision.
c) LJ Andrews makes clear that:
“the question in any given set of circumstances will be whether the unauthorised person, in carrying out whatever tasks which fall within the scope of “conduct of litigation” have been delegated to him or her, is in truth acting on behalf of the authorised individual. If they are, it is the authorised individual who is conducting the litigation. But if the reality is that the litigation is not being conducted by the unauthorised person for and on behalf of the authorised individual, they will be committing an offence.”
d) What is and is not sufficient supervision and control is a “matter for the regulators”. The Court of Appeal stopped short of giving more specific guidance upon this point.
Practical Implications
The Court of Appeal’s decision makes clear that non-authorised staff can lawfully undertake litigation tasks / reserved legal activity so long as it is done so under supervision by an authorised person under the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA).
This means that a non-authorised person (to include someone who is unqualified) can undertake work connected to the conduct of litigation provided that there is an authorised person who retains responsibility for the actual conduct. This will require evidence within the file that the authorised person is genuinely overseeing the work been carried out by the non-authorised person. The precise evidence and mechanics is a matter for the regulators say the Court of Appeal so it is clear further guidance is needed, sooner rather than later. There will be some ambiguity until such regulatory frameworks are properly clarified.
What is also clear is that where aspects of work are delegated, the authorised person retains responsibility.
So to be clear:
a) Non-authorised staff such as those who are qualified without practice rights and even those who are non-qualified can undertake litigation tasks / reserved activity such as the issue of proceedings, so long as they are acting on behalf of and under supervision from an authorised person.
b) There will need to be adequate evidence available of supervision, particularly if a challenge is raised about who is conducting a particular case. Such evidence may include meetings and discussions with the authorised person. The “proper management supervision and control” remain “a matter for the regulators.” It is anticipated that further regulatory guidance will follow and practitioners should pay full attention to this when it does as it will address what measures ought to be in place to ensure lawfulness.
c) The authorised person retains responsibility for the work undertaken by the non-authorised person.
Many Practitioners will be reassured that the Court of Appeal has ultimately found that properly supervised delegation is both lawful and consistent with regulatory aims of the Legal Services Act 2007.
Accordingly, unauthorised staff may perform litigation tasks, including issuing proceedings, provided they act on behalf of and under appropriate supervision by an authorised individual. They are not themselves “conducting litigation” for the purposes of the LSA.
The court rejected the strict distinction between assisting and conducting litigation and have affirmed that properly supervised delegation is lawful and consistent with the Act’s regulatory objectives.
It is likely that the decision will see more time captured in relation to the acts of delegation and supervision. Such time will remain open to assessment and judicial discretion but there is an open argument that legislatively such time is necessary.
The view of the writer is that an authorised person ought to continue to certify statements of truth such as on the pleadings as this may well be an evidential factor around appropriate supervision.
Who are authorised individuals?
Authorised individuals are anyone who has specific practice rights to conduct litigation, these include:
a) Solicitors
b) Chartered Legal Executives with optional practice rights to conduct litigation
c) Barristers with optional practice rights to conduct litigation
d) Patent and Trademark Attorneys
e) Costs Lawyers (rights to conduct costs litigation only)
Background
The matter arose from a claim by Charles Russell Speechlys (CRS) Solicitors for unpaid legal fees from Julia Mazur and Jerome Stuart. They instructed a law firm called Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS).
Initially the claim brought by GBS was conducted by Mr Peter Middleton, a former solicitor who was 'Head of Commercial Litigation' but had been historically struck off, thus he did not hold a practising certificate.
Julia Mazur and Jerome Stuart challenged Mr Peter Middleton's right to conduct litigation. Initially the SRA's view was that as an employee of GBS he was permitted to undertake reserved activities. This view was held in the first instance decision by the court who accepted witness evidence that Mr Peter Middleton had acted under supervision from a Solicitor Director at GBS.
On appeal to the High Court, the SRA reversed its position, attracting significant criticism for its U-turn from all sides. The High Court ultimately overturning the initial decision in finding that LSA 2007 did not allow the conduct of litigation / reserved activities, even under supervision.
Notably other regulators like Cilex attracted significant criticism following the hearing as they sought to suggest that the High Court decision was always the correct interpretation leaving a significant number of Cilex members seemingly without the right to conduct litigation which they believed they had historically. For Cilex additional qualification has to be sought for standalone practice rights which many members had not sought on the understanding it was not necessary.
The fallout of the decision has seen a swell of uptake from Cilex members to obtain standalone practice rights. It left many members understandably both angry and anxious.
The Court of Appeal Proceedings
Cilex sought permission to appeal which was granted in 2025. The Court of Appeal hearing was expedited and heard across two and a half days on 23, 25 and 26 February.
Nick Bacon KC acted for Cilex in the appeal, whilst Ben Williams KC represented the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) and PJ Kirby KC for Law Centres Network, all in favour.
Against the appeal were the Law Society who were represented by Richard Coleman KC, the SRA represented by Tom Lowethal and both Julia Mazur and Jerome Stuart who represented themselves. Tim Johnston acted for the Legal Services Board (LSB) who struck a more neutral tone, though indicated they were slightly more in favour of the SRA position.
Sitting in the Court of Appeal was the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, Lady Justice Geraldine Andrews and Sir Colin Birss, the Chancellor of the High Court. A highly experienced and formidable trio highlighting the importance and significance of the decision.
The judgment itself was expedited having been published just over a month after the Court of Appeal hearing on 31 March 2026. Vos at the hearing stressed that "every solicitor will be expected to read our judgment". Sir Geoffrey Vos also acknowledged that “people need to understand” and reflected that he hoped “this case will achieve some good and clarity”.
Carrying on Litigation
The Court of Appeal considered what was mean by the words “carry on the conduct of litigation” as defined under the LSA 2007. It was held that:
25.Against this background, my conclusion on the first issue is as follows. An unauthorised person can lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member. The authorised individual retains responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person. The authorised individual is, therefore, the person carrying on the conduct of litigation. The unauthorised person is not carrying on the conduct of litigation and does not commit an offence. The delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person requires proper management supervision and control, the details of which are a matter for the regulators. In some circumstances the degree of appropriate control and supervision will be high, with approval required before things are done. In other, for example routine, circumstances, a lower level of control and supervision will be required. In such cases, it may be sufficient for the authorised individual to conduct regular meetings with the unauthorised person and to sample their work. The degree of prior approval contended for by the Law Society and SRA is not required by the 2007 Act. In short, provided the authorised individual puts in place appropriate arrangements for supervision of and delegation to unauthorised persons, those persons may perform tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation for and on behalf of the authorised individual.
26.The authorised individual retains the responsibility envisaged by the 2007 Act. That includes both: (a) the formal responsibility for the task, such as service, performed by the unauthorised person, and (b) the responsibilities identified at section 1(3) of the 2007 Act as the professional principles which it is the regulatory objective to promote and maintain (see section 1(1) of the 2007 Act). The authorised individual retains the responsibility to act with independence and integrity (section 1(3)(a)), to maintain proper standards of work (section 1(3)(b)), to act in the best interests of their clients (section 1(3)(c)), and to comply with their duty to the court to act with independence and in the interests of justice (section 1(3)(d)).
27. The result of this case means that the role of an unauthorised person in the context of the conduct of litigation is not limited merely to assisting or supporting an authorised individual, and the distinction drawn in the court below by the Law Society and SRA, and adopted by the judge, between (a) supporting (or assisting) and (b) conducting litigation under supervision was not correct. It is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision, provided the authorised individual puts in place appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person.”
What actually constitutes conducting litigation?
The Court of Appeal examined the issue of what constituted conducting litigation. They stated that:
“28. As I have suggested at [24] above, Baxter has been misunderstood. It concerned a situation in which an unauthorised person conducted litigation for a litigant in person, which is not this case. Baxter did not, in its decision, expand the tasks within the ambit of the conduct of litigation. As I have said at [24] above, Baxter applied the “fact and degree” test emerging from Ndole (see [184]-[185]) to the question of whether an unauthorised person (acting for a litigant in person with no right to delegate) had undertaken tasks that amounted to carrying on the conduct of litigation. Baxter decided at [194] and [200] that the unauthorised person in question had not been undertaking purely mechanical tasks and had assumed responsibility for the conduct of the litigation. Those were the correct questions, so Baxter was not wrongly decided.
29. My consideration of the second issue identifies some tasks which are clearly within the conduct of litigation, and some tasks that are clearly outside the conduct of litigation. Despite, however, the obvious desirability of clarity, I have concluded that it is simply not possible to provide a comprehensive list of all those tasks that fall within and outside the conduct of litigation.”
The Court of Appeal considered three limbs:
a) Issuing proceedings before any court in England & Wales. This was found to be clear and narrow and was the process of starting court proceedings by issuing an originating document such as a claim form.
b) Commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings. This was found to be less clear and the Court of Appeal declined to resolved this in the current case.
c) Performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings (such as entering appearances to action). Here the Court of Appeal noted this was limited to formal steps, such as service of documents like the statements of case.
Further the Court of Appeal reflected previous guidance from the Law Society:
193. The Law Society provided the court with a list of litigation work which it contended was unlikely to fall within the statutory definition of “conduct of litigation”. I have identified 7 items from this list, which were neither challenged nor debated. They can, I think, be regarded as common ground (rather than the product of adversarial argument). The following are, therefore, unlikely to fall within the statutory definition of “conduct of litigation”:
i) Pre-litigation work. See Heron Bros Ltd v Central Bedfordshire Council [2015] EWHC 1009 (TCC).
ii) Giving legal advice in connection with court proceedings: See Agassi at [56] and JK v MK (E-Negotiation Ltd and another intervening) [2020] EWFC 2,[2020] 1 WLR 5091 at [27].
iii) Conducting correspondence with the opposing party on behalf of clients: See Agassi at [56].
iv) Gathering evidence. See Factortame at [25] to [29].
v) Instructing and liaising with experts and counsel. See Factortame at [28].
vi) Signing a statement of truth in respect of a statement of case. See O’Connor v Bar Standards Board (unreported, 17 August 2012) at [27].
vii) Signing any other document that the CPR permits to be signed by a legal representative, as defined by CPR Part 2.3.”
What can be seen is that there remains ambiguity over what is and is not the conduct of litigation for supervisory purposes but there is some indication from the Court of Appeal as to what is not. What is clear is that any formal steps should, on balance, be treated as the conduct of litigation unless and until further guidance arrives.
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